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tion," it declined to find that situation 
in Alexander. Id. at 711. The court 
instead vacated the punitive award and 
remanded for retrial the questions of 
whether, and in what amount, A & A's 
conduct justified a punitive damages . 
award. The court also suggested spe-
cific instructions for the jury on re-
mand. 
The Alexander opinion provides 
fresh insight on how the Maryland 
state courts should determine punitive 
damages. Though the court deter-
mined that the standards set by case 
law were sufficient, it also acknowl-
edged that Maryland courts in the past 
may have limited themselves too much 
in reviewing punitive damage awards. 
With the Haslip decision in mind, the 
court in Alexander gave appellate courts 
a green light for considering due pro-
cess when examining punitive damage 
awards. 
The Alexander case also serves to 
remind attorneys and judges of the 
importance of jury instructions for 
punitive damage awards. Juries must 
be told that punitive damages serve to 
punish wrongdoers and deter others 
from similar conduct. Juries need to 
be aware of the standards for actual 
malice and other factors, such as the 
wrongdoer's net worth and ability to 
pay in order to make an informed 
decision. 
- Catherine E. Head 
embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 
801 (d) (2) (0) and abandoned the tradi-
tional common law approach which 
required" speaking authority" before 
the statement was considered an ad-
mission of the principal. 
B & K Rentals and Sales Co. (liB 
& K") stored equipment used in its 
business of renting scaffolding and 
seating for public gatherings in a por-
tion of a warehouse owned by U niver-
sal Leaf Tobacco Co. (" Universal "). 
B & K brought an action for damages 
against Universal, contending that the 
negligence of Universal and its em-
ployees caused a fire which resulted in 
a substantial amount of damage to B & 
K's equipment. Only two Universal 
employees were present and working 
at the warehouse on the day of the fire, 
one of whom died in the fire. B & K 
never deposed or subpoenaed the sur-
viving employee, Leonard Grimes. 
The parties disputed both the avail-
ability of the surviving employee as a 
witness and B & K's efforts to locate 
him at the time of the trial. 
The case turned on the testimony 
of an expert witness, Lieutenant Ken-
neth J. Klasmeier, a fire investigator 
with the Anne Arundel County Fire 
Department. Lt. Klasmeier based his 
testimony on a written report he re-
ceived from another Anne Arundel 
Fire Department Investigator, Lieu-
B & K Rentals and Sales Co. v. tenant James Stallings. Lt. Stallings 
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. : MARY-based his report, regarding his inves-
LAND ABANDONS SPEAKING tigations of the origin and cause of the 
AUTHORITY REQUIREMENT fire, primarily on Grimes' statements 
AND" RES GESTAE" APPROACH at the scene of the fire. Grimes told 
AND BINDS PRINCIPAL BY Lt. Stallings that: 
AGENT'SSTATEMENTSPURSU- 1) Johnson and he were the 
ANT TO F.R.E. 80Hd)(2l(D). only two people working at 
In B & K Rentals and Sales Co. v. the warehouse at the time of 
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 596 A.2d the fire; 
640 (Md. 1991), the Court of Appeals 2) Grimes had lit an acetylene 
of Maryland held that a statement of a torch for Johnson a couple of 
party opponent's agent, which con- hours before the fire; 
cerns a matter within the scope of 3) Johnson was using the torch 
agency or employment and is made to burn strings caught in the 
during the existence of that relation- jack wheels of a wooden dolly; 
ship, may constitute an admission by 4) Grimes heard a popping 
the party opponent. By so ruling, the noise and saw smoke coming 
court of appeals adopted the principle from the area where Johnson 
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had just finished burning the 
string from the jack wheels; 
and 
5) Grimes believed the cause 
of the fire was related to 
Johnson's use of the acetylene 
torch ... 
Id. at 641. 
The trial court excluded both 
Stallings' and Klasmeier's reports. 
The court ruled that the reports were 
inadmissible because each relied on 
Grimes' hearsay statements, and nei-
ther qualified as admissions of a party 
opponent or as part of the res gestae 
exception. Id. at 642. The court of 
special appeals affirmed. The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted cer-
tiorari to consider the laws under 
which evidence of admissions of party 
opponents were admissible. 
The court began its analysis by re-
examining the development of 
Maryland's case law on vicarious ad-
missions. The court noted that Mary-
land courts traditionally implemented 
an evidentiary standard based on 
agency law. Under this traditional 
test, the court required an agent to 
have" speaking authority" before his 
statements qualified as an admission 
of the principal. Id. at 643 (citing 
Brown v. Hebb, 175 A. 602, 607 (Md. 
1934». 
The court recognized the prob-
lems inherent in the application of the 
traditional test of agency law as an 
evidentiary standard. The court 
pointed out that the narrow formula of 
admissibility under the traditional test 
was problematic because it" frequently 
caused courts to exclude the agent's 
highly probative statement on the 
theory that the employer had not au-
thorized the agent to make damaging 
remarks about him ... Id. at 643. (quot-
ing 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence, § 801(d)(2) 
(0)[01] at 219 (1988». 
The court next considered 
Maryland's expansion of the tradi-
tionally narrow formula of admissibil-
ity through the adoption of the res 
gestae exception to the hearsay rule. 
Id. In setting forth the res gestae 
exception, the court held that "in 
order to bind the principal and thus 
constitute an admission by it, the 
agent's statement not only must con-
cern matters within the scope of his 
own agency authority but must also be 
part of the res gestae, i. e., made 
contemporaneously with the transac-
tion to which it relates." Id. (quoting 
Burkowske v. Church Hosp. Corp., 
439 A.2d 40, cen. denied, 293 Md. 
331 (Md. 1982». 
The court then looked at the fail-
ure of the Maryland courts to uni-
formly apply the contemporaneity as-
pect of the loosely defined res gestae 
exception. The court stated that the 
contemporaneity requirement is a to-
tally unnecessary component of the 
hearsay exception for vicarious liabil-
ity. Id. at 644. The reliability of the 
agent's statements stems from the as-
surance that, " [t]he agent is well in-
formed about acts in the course of the 
business, his statements offered against 
the employer are normally against the 
employer's interest, and while the 
employment continues, the employee 
is not likely to make the statements 
unless they are true." Id. at 644 (quot-
ing McCormick on Evidence § 267, at 
788-89 (3d ed. 1984». 
The court acknowledged the gen-
eral disfavor of the res gestae excep-
tion in academic and judicial circles. 
The court noted that the phrase " is 
condemned in academic circles as 'a 
substitute for reasoning' and resulting 
in 'the confusion of thought inevitably 
accompanying the use of inaccurate 
terminology. '" Id. (quoting Morgan, 
A Suggested Classification oj Utter-
ances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 
Yale L.Rev. 229,229 (1923». Con-
cluding that the phrase res gestae was 
too" nebulous," the court adopted the 
more precise analysis embodied in 
Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)(D). Id. at 
645. Federal Rule of Evidence 
. 801 (d)(2)(D) provides that a statement 
made by an agent of a party opponent 
which concerns a matter within the 
scope of the agency or employment 
and is made during the existence of 
that relationship constitutes an admis-
sion of the party opponent. 
The court then cited a variety of 
factors which contributed to its deci-
sion to abandon the traditional com-
mon law rule in favor of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence approach. The 
court noted that the res gestae phrase 
came into use when the theory of 
hearsay was not well developed and 
the various exceptions lacked clear 
definitions. The court pointed out that 
the " [i]ncreased knowledge as well as 
the guidance of a significant majority 
of other states and the federal rules" 
indicated that the traditional approach 
was" too restrictive and unsound. "Id. 
The court further justified its deci-
sion to adopt the provisions ofF.R.E. 
801(d)(2)(D) by noting various prin-
ciples of fairness espoused by other 
jurisdictions that have already adopted 
the Federal Rules of Evidence ap-
proach. The court relied on the offi-
cial comments to section 80 1 (D)(3) (a) 
of Louisiana Code's Evidence Article 
to show the unfairness of the employ-
ers position under the common law 
approach. "[I]t may be said that, in 
accord with principles of substantive 
law, one who undertakes to create an 
agency relationship should generally 
be made to reap the deleterious as well 
as the beneficial effects of what the 
agent sows." B & K, 596 A.2d at 646 
(quoting official commentto La. Code 
Evid. Ann. art. 801(D)(3)(a) (West 
1986). Furthermore, the court noted 
theF.R.E. 801 (d) (2) (D) is moreequi-
table than the common law, in that the 
judge is given discretion to weigh the 
probative value of the evidence against 
the possibility for prejudice to the 
opponent. 
Applying the Federal Rules of 
Evidence approach to the case before 
it, the court of appeals held that Grimes' 
statement at the scene of the fire was 
admissible. The court concluded that 
there was sufficient evidence, inde-
pendent of the statements, to prove 
" that 1) Grimes was Universal's agent; 
2) Grimes' statements concerned ac-
tivities undertaken in the warehouse 
that were within the scope of his 
employment; and 3) Grimes' state-
ments were made during his employ-
ment." Id. at 647. 
The B & K decision is significant 
in that the court of appeals abandoned 
the strict common law approach which 
required that the agent have" speaking 
authority" or that the agent's state-
ment be part of the res gestae. Thus, 
the court illustrated its dissatisfaction 
with the exclusion of valuable proba-
tive evidence, which was the frequent 
result under the common law approach 
and adopted the approach under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. 
- Gloria A. Worch 
Newell v. Richards: BURDEN OF 
PROOF AS TO STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS DEFENSE DOES 
NOT SlDFT TO PLAINTIFF 
REGARDLESS OF FINDINGS 
OF HEALTH CLAIMS 
ARBITRATION PANEL. 
In Newell v. Richards, 594 A.2d 
1152 (Md. 1991), the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland held that a health 
claims arbitration award in favor of 
the defendant health care provider, 
which was based solely on the running 
of the statute of limitations, did not 
serve to shift the ultimate burden of 
proof to the plaintiff with respect to 
the running of the statute of limita-
tions. In reversing the court of special 
appeals, the court held that a health 
claims arbitration award would be 
presumed correct as an evidentiary 
matter, but would not serve to shift the 
burden of proof from the defendant to 
the plaintiff as to the statute of limita-
tions. 
In July of 1980, Estella Newell 
was diagnosed at the Greater Balti-
more Medical Center ("GBMC") as 
having cancer of the uterus and on 
September 30, 1980, she underwent a 
total hysterectomy. Follow-up treat-
ment consisted of external radiation 
treatments administered by Dr. George 
1. Richards, Jr., which took place 
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